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Impacts from Captive Supplies on
Fed Cattle Transaction Prices
Clement E. Ward, Stephen R. Koontz,
and Ted C. Schroeder
Increased use of noncash-price  procurement methods has concerned cattlemen for
the  past  several  years.  This  research  estimated  impacts  of captive  supplies  on
transaction  prices  for  fed  cattle.  Negative  relationships  were  found  between
transaction prices and percentage deliveries from the inventory offorward contracted
and marketing agreement cattle. However, impacts from the absolute size of the total
captive supply inventory were not significant. Price differences were found among
procurement methods with forward contract  prices being much lower. On balance,
captive supplies had small but often negative effects on fed cattle transaction prices.
Key  words:  captive supplies, fed cattle, forward contracts, marketing agreements,
packer feeding, price analysis, price discovery, procurement methods
Introduction
Increased meatpacking concentration and increased use of noncash-price procurement
methods for fed cattle by meatpackers recently led to a congressionally mandated study
of  multiple  issues  related  to  meatpacking  concentration  (Packers  and  Stockyards
Program).1 In this article, we report results from one component of the larger study.
The general objective of this research was to determine impacts of captive supplies
(i.e.,  cattle  owned  or  committed  to  a  specific  packer  two  weeks  or  more  prior  to
slaughter) on cash or spot market transaction prices for fed cattle.  Specific objectives
were to: (a) estimate the extent to which cash market fed cattle transaction prices are
impacted by delivering cattle from an inventory of captive  supplies, (b) estimate the
extent  to which  transaction  prices  are  impacted  by buyers  having an inventory  of
captive  supplies from which delivery could be made, and (c) estimate price differences
between cash market transaction prices and prices for cattle purchased under different
captive supply methods.2
Captive supplies take three forms: (a) packer-owned cattle fed in packer-owned and
commercial feedlots,  (b)  fed cattle purchased by fixed price and basis forward contracts,
and (c) exclusive  marketing and purchasing agreements for procuring fed cattle. Packer-
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fed  cattle are  transferred  from  a  feedlot  to  the  slaughter plant when  cattle  reach
slaughter weight, and a transfer  price is assigned to the cattle  on the day they are
slaughtered. Basis contracting involves a packer bidding a basis (i.e., cash minus futures
market price) for the month fed cattle are expected to reach slaughter weight. The cattle
feeder reserves the right to decide when to price the cattle (i.e., select a futures market
price) prior to delivery of cattle  to the packer.  Once the cattle are priced, the basis
contract essentially becomes a fixed price forward contract. Exclusive feedlot marketing
or packer purchasing agreements are, in essence, supply contracts in which the cattle
feeder agrees to market a specified number of cattle for some specified time period (e.g.,
week, month, or year) to a given buyer. Price is based on a prearranged formula, typi-
cally consisting of a base price with premiums and discounts associated with variation
in cattle quality.
One element common to each form of captive supply is that packers have some portion
of their desired slaughter volume purchased two weeks or more prior to the livestock
being slaughtered.3 These  forward  purchases  enable  packers  to  coordinate  captive
supply deliveries with cash market purchases and deliveries. A major question, then,
is whether the use of captive supplies affects slaughter cattle prices. Only a few previous
studies have examined this issue, and all suffer from limitations involving data breadth
and detail, time period, or modeling approach.
Elam compared forward contracting in six Texas feedlots with hedging fed cattle over
the  period  May  1987  through  September  1989.  He  reported  contract  prices  were
$0.28-$0.59/cwt  lower than hedged prices for steers,  and $0.86-$1.64/cwt  lower  for
heifers.  Cattle  feeders  were giving  up a portion  of the  basis to  packers  when they
forward contracted cattle. This could be considered a risk transfer premium from cattle
feeders  to packers. Elam also estimated  the effect  captive  supply deliveries  had on
monthly average  fed cattle  prices in the U.S.  and in Texas,  Kansas, Colorado,  and
Nebraska. Captive supply deliveries were inversely related to fed cattle prices over the
period October 1988 through May 1991. For each 10,000 cattle delivered under captive
supply arrangements,  U.S.  fed cattle  prices  declined  by  $0.03-$0.09/cwt,  while  for
individual states, results ranged from not significant to -$0.37/cwt.
Eilrich et al. compared forward contracting with hedging fed cattle using data from
five feedlots  covering the period 1988-90. Their findings  showed that both net basis
contract  prices  and  hedged  prices  were  lower  than  estimated  cash  prices.  Price
differences ranged from $1.57-$1.77/cwt assuming either $0.20/cwt or $0.40/cwt trans-
portation costs,  respectively.  This  price  difference  is the  risk transfer  premium for
forward contracting at a fixed price or basis.
Hayenga and O'Brien examined the effect of captive supplies on weekly average fed
cattle prices and price variability in Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas over the
15-month period from October  1988 through December  1989.  They found effects that
were usually not significant or that had mixed positive and negative signs relative to
other market prices.
The sole previous study which examined the relationship between forward contracting
(including marketing agreements) and transaction prices for fed cattle was conducted
by Schroeder et al.  (1993).  They collected data from feedlots in southwestern Kansas
3 Both the Grain Inspection, Packers and  Stockyards Administration  (GIPSA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture/
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA/AMS) use the two-week-ahead period to differentiate captive supply purchases from
spot market purchases.
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from May-November  1990. Results indicated a negative relationship between forward
contracting and fed cattle prices, ranging from $0.15 to $0.31/cwt. Price impacts differed
among packers and subperiods within the six-month period and were not significant for
some packers and time periods.
In this study we attempt: (a) to model the interdependent nature of delivering cattle
from  captive  supply  inventories  (i.e.,  for  all  three  types  of captive  supplies)  and
purchasing fed cattle in the cash market; (b) to model the impact on transaction prices
caused by the size of the captive supply inventory from which future deliveries can be
made; and (c) to estimate price differences  between cash market fed cattle prices and
prices  for  cattle  purchased  by  all  three  captive  supply  methods.  Because  of the
congressional mandate for this work,  access to data was unique and better than all
previous studies dealing with captive supply impacts. Relative to other studies, data for
this study: (a) came directly from transaction records of the largest meatpacking plants
and firms, rather than a few feedlots; (b) covered a broader geographic  area, i.e., cattle
procurement  from  nearly  the  entire  United  States;  (c)  encompassed  transactions
from a longer time period, i.e., twice as long as that used by Schroeder et al. (1993);
(d) contained  transaction details  on  all types  of captive  supplies,  rather than just
forward  contracts  and  marketing  agreements;  and  (e)  utilized  several  times more
observations than any previous study. Unique access to data enabled modeling captive
supply impacts not heretofore possible due to significant data limitations.
Data
Transaction records were collected by the Packers and Stockyards Program from the 43
largest steer and heifer slaughtering plants owned by 25 firms. Data consisted of each
sale lot of 35 head or more during slaughter days from April  5, 1992 through April 3,
1993. Each sale lot record included the following: (a) packing plant and firm identi-
fication; (b) cattle slaughter date; (c) cattle purchase date; (d) number of head; (e) cattle
sex or type  (steers,  heifers,  dairy,  Holstein,  or  mixed  lots of cattle);  (f)  pricing  or
purchasing  method  (live  weight  cash-price  purchase,  dressed  weight  cash-price
purchase,  forward  contract  purchase,  packer-fed  transfer,  or marketing  agreement
purchase);  (g) total purchase  weight  (live weight  and  dressed weight);  (h)  average
dressing percentage; (i) total delivered cost; (j)  average cost/cwt (dressed weight $/cwt);
(k) distribution of carcasses among quality grades; (I) distribution of carcasses  among
yield grades; and (m) transportation  and commission costs.
Records  kept by individual  firms  or plants differed.  As a result of missing data,
irreconcilable differences in data, incompatible data among plants, and data errors, the
usable data set consisted of 139,189 sale lot observations from 28 plants owned by nine
firms, including all "big three" packers (Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder).4 Transactions
used accounted for 16.5 million fed cattle, representing 63.2% of total steer and heifer
purchases in 1993.  Secondary  data supplemented  primary data and included:  daily
boxed beef cutout values  from the USDA/AMS,  and daily live cattle futures market
prices from the Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange (CME).  Variables  used are defined in
table 1, and summary statistics for selected variables are presented in table 2.
4 Usable data consisted of 69.4% of all transaction records collected by the Packers and Stockyards Program.
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Conceptual Framework and
Model  Development
In  a general  supply-demand  framework,  procurement  of fed  cattle  by  each  captive
supply method reduces the supply of market-ready fed cattle that can be purchased in
the cash market during the normal one to two weeks prior to slaughter. Effectively, the
short-run supply  curve  for market-ready  fed cattle  shifts  to the left. Packers  using
captive supply procurement  methods purchase  fewer fed cattle from the spot market
because a percentage  of their slaughter needs will be met from captive supply cattle
deliveries. Thus, the short-run demand curve for fed cattle also shifts to the left. The net
price effect is unknown with certainty and requires empirical estimation. Conceptually,
the "new" demand curve could intersect the "new" supply curve at a price above, equal
to, or below the initial price. The "new" short-run equilibrium price depends on the exact
shape and position of the two curves. This supply-demand framework leads to a simple
model for analyzing captive  supplies.
Both cattle feeders and meatpackers have economic incentives to enter into captive
supply arrangements.  Schroeder et al. (1997) identify several. Incentives for using for-
ward contracts include: for cattle feeders-reduce price risk, obtain favorable financing,
ensure buyer access for cattle, and reduce transactions  costs; and for packers-secure
slaughter needs,  secure  desired quality  of fed cattle, reduce  transactions  costs, and
reduce  price  risk.  Incentives  for  using  marketing  agreements  include:  for  cattle
feeders-receive  premiums  for  some  cattle  quality  characteristics,  obtain  carcass
information,  ensure buyer  access for  cattle,  and  reduce  transactions  costs;  and  for
packers-increase  cattle  quality  control,  secure  slaughter needs,  and reduce trans-
actions costs. Incentives for packer feeding include: for cattle feeders-increase feedlot
utilization and improve packer-feedlot relationship; and for packers-secure slaughter
needs, earn profits from cattle feeding, and increase cattle quality control. The problem
is not simple, and this literature is developing (Hennessy).
Our  approach  follows  that of previous  research  and  uses  a  simple  model  which
addresses the specific objectives. The reduced-form transaction price models estimated
here are those derived by Schroeder et al. (1993). In the Schroeder et al. study, supply
and demand equations  for contract  and spot market  purchases are used to derive  a
reduced-form  model where fed cattle transaction prices are a function  of beef prices,
animal characteristics, the amount of contracting,  and other factors. The model allows
for  straightforward  measurement  of the impact  of captive  supplies  on  transaction
prices.
Three issues are addressed in this study. First, packers' decisions to deliver captive
supply cattle and to purchase cash market cattle are likely determined simultaneously.
Conceivably, packers could purchase cattle in the cash market and then determine how
many and when to deliver captive supply cattle. Alternatively, packers could decide how
many and when to deliver captive supply cattle, and then determine how many cattle
to purchase in the cash market. The order of causality determines whether packers can
use captive supplies as a strategic decision variable, i.e., whether they exercise market
power by  delivering forward  purchased cattle  to reduce  their need for cash market
purchases, and thereby reduce cash market transaction prices. These issues are treated
in Model 1, below.
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Table 1.  Definitions of Variables
Variable  Definition
Model  1, Equation (1):
PCPt  Each plant's captive supply and cash (spot) market purchases of cattle on the
day cash market cattle were purchased,  as a percentage of the plant's
maximum capacity.
NFCt  Number of head of forward contracted cattle purchased by each plant on day t.
NPFt  Number of head of packer-fed cattle purchased by each plant on day t.
NMAt  Number of head of marketing agreement cattle purchased by each plant on
day t.
NSPt  Number of head of cash market cattle purchased by each plant on day t.
CAP  Maximum daily plant capacity for each plant during the data period.
Model  1, Equations (2)-(4):
PQFCt  Percentage of forward contracted cattle during the market window period
(t plus 28 days) which were delivered to each plant on the day cash market
cattle were purchased.
PQPFt  Percentage of packer-fed cattle during the market window period (t plus 28
days) which were delivered to each plant on the day cash market cattle were
purchased.
PQMAt  Percentage of marketing agreement cattle during the market window period
(t plus 28 days) which were delivered to each plant on the day cash market
cattle were purchased.
BSSt  Basis on the day cash market cattle were purchased  (dressed weight cash
market price converted to a live weight price minus the preceding day's
closing live cattle futures market price for the nearby contract).
TRPRCt  Cash market transaction price on the day cash market cattle were purchased.
LCFMPt-_  Preceding day's closing live cattle futures market price for the nearby
contract.
DDOW, t  Zero-one  dummy variable  for day of the week cash market cattle were
purchased (Monday, Tuesday,..., Saturday/Sunday).
DMONi,t  Zero-one dummy variable for month of the year cash market cattle were
purchased (January, February, ..., December).
Model  1, Equation (5): a
ABBCVt_  Preceding day's boxed beef cutout value on the day cash market cattle were
purchased, adjusted for the percentage of the sale lot grading USDA Choice
grade and above, or Select grade and below.
DTYPit  Zero-one  dummy variable  for the type of cattle purchased (steers, heifers,
mixed sex, Holstein, and dairy cattle).
AHotWtt  Average dressed weight of the sale lot.
NoHdt  Number of head in the sale lot.
PYG1-3t  Percentage of USDA Yield Grade 1-3 cattle in the sale lot.
FWDt  Number of days between purchase and delivery for cash market cattle on the
day cash market cattle were purchased.
TRNDt  Month cattle were purchased.
DPLT,t  Zero-one dummy variable for the packing plant that purchased cash market
cattle (plant 1,  plant 2,  ..., plant 28).
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Table 1.  Continued
Variable Definition
Model 2, Equation (6): a
QFCt  Number of forward contracted cattle available for delivery over the next 28
days, on the day cash market cattle were purchased.
QPFt Number of packer-fed cattle available for delivery over the next 28 days, on the
day cash market cattle were purchased.
QMAt  Number of marketing agreement cattle available for delivery over the next
28 days, on the day cash market cattle were purchased.
QTOTt  Number of forward contracted, packer-fed,  and marketing agreement cattle
available for delivery over the next 28 days, on the day cash market cattle
were purchased.
Model 3, Equation (7): a
PPRCt  Purchase price (purchase price or transfer price) on the day cattle were
purchased.
FWDALLt  Number of days between purchase  and delivery for cash market and captive
supply cattle on the day cash market cattle were purchased.
DMETH, t  Zero-one  dummy variable for procurement methods (DFWDCONt = forward
contract, DPKRFEDt  = packer-fed, DMKTAGREEt = marketing agreement,
and DCASHt = cash market).
aVariables not previously defined.
Table 2.  Selected  Summary Statistics
Variable  Unit  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.
Noncaptive  Supply Variables:
TRPRCt  $/cwt  121.10  5.98  105.00  142.00
ABBCVtl  $/cwt  115.60  4.53  107.07  128.93
LCFMPt-,  $/cwt  75.55  3.08  70.10  83.72
BSSt  $/cwt  0.74  2.34  -15.89  15.29
PCPt  %  155.9  123.8  1.00  1,501
AHotWtt  lbs.  731.8  60.4  442  1,028
NoHdt  head  118.3  94.0  35  1,116
PYG1-3  %  95.9  5.7  0.00  100
FWDt  days  5.8  3.0  0.00  14
FWDALLt days  13.3  31.0  0.00  390
Captive Supply Variables:
PQFCt  %  5.8  11.0  0.00  100
PQPFt  %  5.7  11.1  0.00  100
PQMA  %  5.2  5.4  0.00  100
QFCt  head  7,201  12,149  0.00  67,398
QPFt  head  640  1,748  0.00  10,877
QMAt  head  11,929  14,785  0.00  66,985
Ward, Koontz, and  SchroederJournal  ofAgricultural and Resource Economics
Second, packers who have an inventory of captive  supply cattle are alleged to use
the  size  of their  inventory  to  bid  lower  for  cash  market  cattle,  and  thus  reduce
transaction prices for cash market purchases. This second issue differs from the first.
The first focuses on simultaneously delivering from the captive supply inventory  and
purchasing  cash  market  cattle,  whereas  the  second  measures  transaction  price
impacts from having a given size inventory of captive supply cattle from which to deliver
for slaughter at some future  time. This issue is empirically tested using Model 2,  as
discussed below.
Third, forward contract prices are expected to be lower than cash prices based on both
theoretical  (Carlton)  and empirical work (Elam;  Eilrich et al.).  The degree  to which
packer-fed cattle  prices and marketing  agreement fed cattle  prices differ from spot-
market cattle prices is unknown. Model 3, presented later, addresses this concern.
Model 1: Captive Supply Shipments-Price
Relationships Model
The following simultaneous system of equations models how cash market transaction
prices are affected by delivering fed cattle from a captive supply inventory. This model
provides a test of whether packers use captive supplies as a strategic decision variable,
as discussed previously. The system includes four equations which capture the variation
in the  three  captive  supply variables  and the  transaction  price.  All  equations  are
basically reduced-form models of each quantity and price. Variations in the quantities
are explained as a function of a relevant price and other supply and demand factors.
Variations  in transaction prices are  explained  as a function of quantities and  other
supply and demand factors. The unit of observation is a transaction record for a sale
lot of fed cattle  purchased on  day t,  i.e., the  purchase  date for cash market  cattle.
Define each plant's captive supplies plus cash purchases as a percentage of its capacity
as follows:
(1)  PCP t = [(NFCt + NPFt + NMA t + NSPt)/CAP] x  100,
where PCP,  is each plant's captive supply and cash (spot) market purchases of cattle on
the day cash market  cattle were purchased,  as a percentage  of the plant's maximum
capacity; NFCt is the number of head of forward contracted cattle purchased by each
plant on day t; NPFt  is the number of head of packer-fed cattle purchased by each plant
on day t; NMAt is the number of head of marketing agreement cattle purchased by each
plant on day t; NSP, is the number of head of cash market cattle purchased by each
plant on day t; and CAP is the maximum daily plant capacity for each plant during the
data period (table 1).
Maximum  daily  slaughter  (CAP)  was  based  on the  largest  number  of fed  cattle
slaughtered  by  each plant  on any  one  day  during the  data  period.  Purchases  as a
percentage  of plant capacity (PCP,) were computed for each day and assigned to all
transaction  records for cash market purchases  of fed cattle on that same day. On any
given day, significantly more cattle may be purchased by a packer than are slaughtered.
For  example,  two  previous  studies  found  significantly more  cattle  were  purchased
earlier in the week (Monday through Wednesday)  than later in the week (Ward 1992;
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Schroeder et al.  1993). Plant sizes varied widely. Daily purchases of fed cattle, both in
total and by each procurement method, also varied widely. Therefore,  daily purchases
were converted to percentages of plant capacity to reduce the absolute disparity among
plants and days.
Captive Supply Deliveries. The three forms of captive supply deliveries (i.e., forward
contracted,  packer-fed, and marketing agreement)  are related to economic conditions
present at the time these deliveries can be made. The models listed below were specified
to explain the three forms of captive supply deliveries.
*  Forward Contract Deliveries:
(2)  PQFC t = f(BSS t, TRPRCt, PCP t, DDOWi,t, DMON,t),
where PQFCt  is the percentage of forward contracted cattle during the market window
period (t plus  28  days)  delivered  to each plant  on the day  cash market cattle were
purchased; BSSt is the basis on the day cash market cattle were purchased; TRPRCt
is the cash market transaction  price on the day cash  market cattle were purchased;
DDOWj,, is a zero-one dummy variable for day of the week cash market cattle were pur-
chased (Monday,  Tuesday,  ... , Saturday/Sunday);  and DMONj  is a zero-one  dummy
variable  for month  of the year  cash  market  cattle  were  purchased  (January,  Feb-
ruary, ... , December) (table 1).
*  Packer-Fed Deliveries:
(3)  PQPF t = f(LCFMPt_,  TRPRCt, PCP t, DDOWi, t,  DMONit),
where PQPFt  is the percentage  of packer-fed cattle during the market window period
(t plus 28 days) delivered to each plant on the day cash market cattle were purchased,
LCFMPt 1 is the preceding day's closing live cattle futures market price for the nearby
contract, and other variables are as defined previously (table  1).
*  Marketing Agreement Deliveries:
(4)  PQMAt  = f(LCFMP,_ , TRPRCt, PCPt,  DDOWi,t9 DMON\,t),
where  PQMAt is the percentage  of marketing  agreement cattle  during the  market
window period (t plus 28 days) delivered to each plant on the day cash market cattle
were purchased, and other variables are as defined previously (table 1).
The percentage of available captive supply cattle delivered  by individual plants on
specific  dates (PQFCt,  PQPFt,  PQMAt) varied by day  and month. Therefore,  dummy
variables were included in equations (2)-(4) for day of the week (DDOWit) and month
of the year (DMONi  t).  Basis (BSSt) was calculated by subtracting the preceding day's
closing live cattle  futures market price for the nearby contract  (LCFMPt l) from the
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dressed  weight  price  times  63%  (i.e.,  an estimated  average  dressing  percentage  to
convert the dressed weight price to a live weight price).5
Data did not allow computing the total inventory of forward contracted, packer-fed,
and marketing agreement cattle. Therefore, captive supply inventory variables (PQFC,,
PQPF,,  PQMA,) were estimated by summing the number of cattle actually delivered for
each respective type of captive supply during the following 28 days. The percentage of
forward  contracted,  packer-fed,  and marketing  agreement  cattle delivered  from the
moving 28-day inventory was computed and assigned to all transaction records for each
cash market purchase day.
Transaction Price. The  cash  market  transaction  price  for each  pen of cattle was
modeled as:
(5)  TRPRCt = f(ABBCVt  , LCFMPt 1, DTYPi,t, AHotWtt,
AHotWt 2, NoHdt, NoHd2, PYG1-3t, FWDt,
DDOWi,tc  PCP, TRND , TRND  ,  TRND  ,
DPLT t ,  PQFC t, PQPF,,  PQMAt),
where ABBCVt _ is the preceding day's boxed beef cutout value on the day cash market
cattle were purchased, adjusted for the percentage of the sale lot grading USDA Choice
grade and above, or Select grade and below; DTYPit is a zero-one  dummy variable  for
the type  of cattle  purchased (steers,  heifers,  mixed sex, Holstein,  and dairy cattle);
AHotWtt is the average dressed weight of the sale lot; NoHd, is the number of head in
the sale lot; PYG1-3t is the percentage  of USDA Yield Grade 1-3 cattle in the sale lot;
FWDt is the number of days between purchase and delivery for cash market cattle  on
the day cash market cattle were purchased; TRNDt is the month cattle were purchased;
DPLTit  is a zero-one dummy variable for the packing plant that purchased cash market
cattle (plants 1-28); and other variables  are as defined previously (table 1).
Several variables included in equation  (5) are based on previous studies explaining
the variation in fed cattle transaction prices (Jones et al.; Schroeder et al. 1993; Ward
1981,  1992), including: boxed beef cutout value adjusted for the percentage of the sale
lot grading USDA Choice grade and above, or Select grade and below (ABBCVt  i);6 live
cattle futures  market  price (LCFMPt  ,);  type of cattle  (DTYPi,); weight of the cattle
(AHotWtt, AHotWtt); number of  head in the sale lot (NoHdt, NoHdt ); percentage of cattle
which  yield  grade  1-3  (PYG1-3t); number  of days  between  purchase  and  delivery
(FWDt); day of the week (DDOWit); and the plant which purchased the cattle (DPLTit).
Cash market prices also were expected to depend on plant utilization, here proxied by
purchases  as  a  percentage  of  plant  capacity  (PCPt), to  account  for  the  functional
relationship  between plant utilization  and  slaughter  processing  costs  (Ward  1993).
5 The nearby contract was moved to the next contract at the beginning  of the contract maturity month.
6 ABBCVt_l = (BBCVChice, x %Choice) +  (BBCVseiect x %Select), where BBCV is boxed beef cutout value.  Four boxed  beef
cutout value data series were used (Choice, YG1-3, 550-700 lbs.; Choice, YG1-3, 700-850 lbs.; Select, YG1-3, 550-700 lbs.;
and Select, YG1-3, 700-850 lbs.). Each transaction was matched with the appropriate  boxed beef cutout value based on the
average dressed weight of the sale lot.
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During the study period, prices trended downward, then reversed and trended upward
for the remainder of the period. Therefore, cubic time-trend variables  (TRNDt, TRND2
TRNDt )were included to remove trend in cash fed cattle prices not fully captured by
trends in  boxed beef cutout values  or  live cattle  futures  market prices.  Time-trend
variables are discussed more fully in the results section; however, they capture in part
the time between purchase  or contract date and the delivery date. Variables  for the
extent of captive  supply deliveries (PQFCt,  PQPFt,  PQMAt) were included to measure
the transaction price impacts from captive supply deliveries.
Model 2: Captive Supply Inventory-Price
Relationships  Model
Model  1, described  above, estimates how deliveries of captive supply cattle affect cash
market cattle prices. A second model was estimated to determine whether buyers having
an inventory of fed cattle procured by captive supply methods impact fed cattle trans-
action prices. No simultaneity is implied in estimating the relationship between size of
the captive  supply inventory at the time cash market cattle are purchased and cash
market transaction prices. Therefore, the cash market transaction price was modeled as:
(6)  TRPRCt = f(ABBCVt  , LCFMPt_ , DTYP,t, AHotWtt,
AHotWtt2, NoHdt, NoHdt 2, PYG1-3 t, FWDt,
DDOWt, PCPt, TRNDt, TRND  ,  TRND/,
DPLTit, QFCt, QPFt, QMAt),
where QFCt is the number of forward contracted  cattle available for delivery over the
next 28  days,  on the day cash market  cattle were purchased;  QPFt  is the number  of
packer-fed cattle available for delivery over the next 28 days, on the day cash market
cattle were purchased; QMAt is the number of marketing agreement cattle available for
delivery over the next 28 days, on the day cash market cattle were purchased; and other
variables are as defined previously (table 1).
Model 2 is similar to equation (5) of Model  1 in that several variables are included to
explain variation in fed cattle transaction prices, but Model 2 differs in two ways. First,
variables for percentage deliveries from the captive supply inventory are replaced by
variables for the size of the captive supply inventory (QFCt, QPF,,  QMAt). Variables for
captive supply inventory were included to measure the  e effect on cash market transaction
prices from changes in the size of the captive supply inventory. As before, captive supply
inventory variables are based on the number of captive supply cattle actually delivered
during the  following  28  days.  Second,  Model  2  is a  single-equation  model with  no
assumptions  of simultaneity, rather than a system of equations  as in Model  1 which
assumed  simultaneity  of decisions  to  deliver  cattle  from the  inventory  of captive
supplies and to purchase cattle in the cash market. The interaction between quantities
and price from  Model  1  are of paramount interest, but the results  from Model 2  are
directly comparable to previous research.  Also, the results from Models  1 and 2 will be
compared to assess the robustness of alternative specifications.
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Model 3: Captive Supply-Cash Price
Differences Model
Previous research found price differences between forward contracted prices or hedged
prices and estimated cash transaction prices (Eilrich et al.). To date, data have not been
available to estimate price differences for fed cattle procured by different methods. Thus,
Model 3 is specified to estimate the price difference between cash transaction prices for
fed cattle and prices for fed cattle purchased under three captive supply methods. The
cash market transaction price was modeled as:
(7)  PPRCt = f(ABBCVt l, LCFMPt 1, DTYP, t, AHotWt t,
AHotWt2, NoHdt, NoHdf2, PYG1-3 t ,  FWDALLt ,
2  3 DDOWi,,  PCPt, TRNDt, TRNDt,  TRND,
DPLTi,t, DMETHit),
where PPRCt is the purchase price (purchase price or transfer price) on the day cattle
were purchased;  FWDALLt is the number of days between purchase  and delivery for
cash market and captive supply cattle on the day cash market cattle were purchased;
DMETH,  t is a zero-one  dummy variable for procurement methods  (forward contract,
packer-fed, marketing agreement,  or cash market); and other variables are as defined
previously (table 1).
Model  3, like equation  (5) of Model  1 and equation (6) of Model  2, includes several
variables  to  explain  variation  in  fed  cattle  transaction  prices.  In this  model,  the
dependent variable is the purchase price (PPRC t) for cash market and captive supply
cattle,  rather than just cash market  cattle  as in Models  1 and  2.  Two independent
variables in Model 3 also differ from previous models. Previous research found that the
time between purchase date and slaughter date affected transaction prices (Ward 1981,
1992; Schroeder et al. 1993). In this model, a similar variable was added to measure the
difference  between purchase and slaughter date for all purchases  (FWDALL,), rather
than just for cash market purchases as in previous studies  and in the preceding two
models.  Second, a variable was added to measure the difference between cash market
transaction prices and prices for fed cattle purchased by other methods (DMETHt).
Empirical Results
Two-stage  least squares  regression  [Model  1,  equations  (2)-(5)]  and ordinary  least
squares regression [Models  2 and 3, equations (6) and (7)] were used. Reported signif-
icance  of  coefficients  refers  to the  0.01  level.  Several  versions  of each  model were
estimated,  some using plant dummy variables, firm dummy variables,  some using 28-
day captive  supply inventories,  and  14-day inventories.  Models  were  estimated  for
the entire one-year  data period, while others  also were estimated for quarterly sub-
periods. Only the 28-day/plant versions (i.e., models including plant dummy variables)
of Models 1 and 2 estimated for the entire one-year period are reported here. For Model
2, two types of captive supply inventory variables were included-individual variables
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Table 3.  Noncaptive  Supply Variables: Selected  Results from Transaction
Price Equations, Models  1-3 ($/cwt)
Model  1  Model 2  Model 3
Variable  Equation (5)  Equation (6)  Equation (7)
ABBCVt  1  0.51*  0.48*  0.59*
(105.77)  (99.49)  (196.58)
LCFMPt  0.28*  0.36*  0.27*
(32.36)  (49.35)  (53.85)
AHotWtt  0.01*  0.022*  0.007*
(4.39)  (7.54)  (3.27)
AHotWt2  -0.00001*  -0.000018*  -0.00001*
(7.07)  (9.45)  (6.61)
NoHdt  0.004*  0.004*  0.005*
(19.89)  (16.90)  (24.60)
NoHd  -0.000006*  -0.000005*  -0.000008*
(13.83)  (10.63)  (19.19)
PYG1-3t 0.05*  0.06*  0.04*
(35.06)  (30.18)  (31.01)




PCPt  0.003*  0.002*  0.001*
(28.02)  (16.86)  (19.18)
Notes:  An asterisk (*)  denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values
of calculated t-statistics.
described previously for each type of captive supply inventory (i.e., QFCt, QPFt, QMAt),
and a single captive  supply inventory variable (QTOTt) which is the sum of the three
individual captive supply inventories.  Only the plant version of Model 3 estimated for
the entire one-year period is reported here. Results are robust for the alternative speci-
fications.  (Complete results are  provided in Ward,  Koontz,  and Schroeder.)  Selected
results for noncaptive supply variables are discussed below, followed by a discussion of
the captive supply variables.
Noncaptive Supply Variables
Table 3 provides a comparison of selected results from the transaction price equations
for Models  1, 2, and 3. Numerous noncaptive supply factors  explained the variation in
fed  cattle transaction  prices,  many of which were  significant  in previous  research.
Results were generally robust across the three models. Exceptions  and similarities or
differences with prior work are noted briefly here.
Boxed  beef  cutout  values,  adjusted  by  quality  grade  of  cattle  in  the  sale  lot
(ABBCVt  l),  and  closing prices  for  the  nearby  live  cattle  futures  market  contract
(LCFMPt l) directly affected fed cattle prices, consistent with Schroeder et al. (1993) and
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Ward  (1992).  Several  variables representing  cattle  quality significantly  affected  fed
cattle prices. Type of cattle (i.e., steers, heifers, Holsteins) affected prices as expected,
as did average  dressed weight of carcasses  in the sale lot. Unlike  previous research
(Jones et al.; Ward 1992), a quadratic rather than linear relationship was found between
number of head in the sale lot and prices paid  (NoHdt and NoHd2). Higher transaction
prices were associated with an increased percentage of cattle in the sale lot which yield
graded 1-3 (PYG1-3t), similar to previous findings (Schroeder et al. 1993).
Fed cattle prices differed by day of the week when cattle were purchased (DDOWjt).
While not reported in tables here, highest transaction prices were found on Monday, the
same day as  in previous  studies  (Schroeder  et al.  1993;  Ward  1992).  However,  the
remaining within-week pattern differed among the three studies. Coefficients on day-of-
week variables were less robust among versions  of the models than other variables.
Results confirm significant within-week price differences, but suggest the within-week
pattern may vary due to differences in model specification,  data, or study period.
Fed cattle prices during the study period exhibited a seasonal pattern. Initially, time-
trend variables were excluded  from the models, but later were added to Model  3,  as
discussed subsequently, then added to the transaction price equation of Model 1 and to
Model 2. Inclusion of the cubic time-trend variables  (TRNDt, TRND 2, TRND
3 ) resulted
in capturing the within-year pattern of cash market fed cattle prices during the year
studied which were not represented fully by movements in boxed beef cutout values and
live cattle futures market prices. Inclusion of  these variables does not qualitatively alter
noncaptive supply or the captive  supply results from the models.
Number  of days between  purchase  and  delivery  of cattle purchased  in the cash
market  (FWDt) was related  to  fed cattle  prices.  A similar variable  had a negative
relationship  with fed cattle  prices in  1979 (Ward  1981), but a positive effect in 1989
(Ward 1992) and 1990 (Schroeder et al. 1993). As number of days between purchase and
delivery of only cash market cattle increased,  so did fed cattle prices (Models  1 and 2).
However,  for Model  3,  as number  of days between  purchase  and  delivery of cattle
purchased by all procurement methods increased, the effect on cash market fed cattle
prices was negative. This difference probably relates to the time lag between purchase
and slaughter date for forward contracted cattle compared with the shorter purchase
and slaughter date difference for cash market cattle.
Purchases as a percentage of plant capacity (PCPt)  were expected to affect transaction
prices for fed cattle, but no comparable variable had been used in previous transaction
price  models.  Coefficients  on  the  percentage  purchases  variable  were  consistently
positive.  Economies  of  size  and  differences  in plant utilization  exist  among  cattle
slaughtering and carcass fabricating plants (Ward 1993). Larger, more efficient plants
can pay more for fed cattle than smaller, less efficient plants,  but may do  so only if
sufficient  competition exists among firms. Although packers paid significantly higher
prices when purchases as a percentage  of capacity increased  (which was a proxy for
increased plant utilization), the magnitude of the price increase was small.
Previous research found differences in prices paid for fed cattle among packers (Ward
1992; Schroeder et al. 1993). The comparison of plant results (DPLTi,t) in table 4 indi-
cates price differences among plants varied widely within and between models.7 Thus,
7Plants are not identified  by name or location to preserve confidentiality.
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'Base  plant is in Kansas.
Figure 1.  Average price differences  ($/cwt)  across three
groups of plants
coefficients  on the price differences paid by plants were less robust than for most other
variables. The base plant in all models was a large plant located in Kansas. There was
a tendency  for plants paying lower prices  to be  smaller  or located  farther from the
primary  cattle  feeding  area  (i.e.,  the  plains  region  of  Texas,  Oklahoma,  Kansas,
Colorado, and Nebraska). A map showing average price differences across three groups
of plants is presented in figure 1. Highest prices were paid by plants located in and near
Kansas, and lowest prices were paid by plants located farthest from the Kansas area.
It  should be noted, however, that there were exceptions within each of the three areas
in figure  1.  Results from this model were consistent with findings from the fed cattle
regional market definition component  of the larger Packers and Stockyards Program
study (Hayenga, Koontz,  and Schroeder).  Packers tend to operate in a more national
than regional  market  for fed  cattle  procurement.  Spatial  arbitrage  across  regional
markets keeps prices well integrated.
Captive Supply Variables
Model 1: Captive Supply Deliveries,  Equations  (2)-(4). Factors expected to explain the
variation in deliveries from the captive supply inventory for each plant, besides day of
the week and month of the year,  included: basis, current cash prices, and percentage
purchases of plant capacity for forward contracted cattle; expected prices, current cash
prices,  and  percentage  purchases  of plant  capacity  for  packer-fed  and  marketing
agreement  cattle. Barkley and Schroeder  found that packers  use captive supplies to
keep plant utilization high. Therefore,  an inverse relationship was expected between
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Table 4.  Plant Dummy Variables: Selected Results,  Models  1-3 ($/cwt)
Model 1  Model  2  Model 3
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Table 4.  Continued
Model  1  Model 2  Model 3
Variable  Equation (5)  Equation (6)  Equation (7)
DPLT23i t - 1.26*  a  0.33*
(9.91)  (7.09)
DPLT24it - 1.95*  -1.37*  -0.88*
(19.84)  (16.32)  (15.78)
DPLT25i, t -2.48*  a  -1.11*
(18.06)  (15.66)
DPLT26i,  t -3.12*  a  -2.35*
(22.66)  (33.88)
DPLT27it -1.96*  -
a -0.49*
(14.58)  (7.53)
DPLT28it - 1.38*  0.33  0.09
(10.49)  (1.60)  (1.46)
Notes:  An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values
of calculated t-statistics.
a Plant did not have captive supplies.
purchases as a percentage of plant capacity (PCPt)  and captive supply deliveries. Results
were mixed.  Percentage  purchases  were inversely  related  to increased deliveries  of
packer-fed and marketing agreement cattle as expected, but positively associated with
increased deliveries from the inventory of forward contracted cattle. The reason for the
difference is not known.
It  was expected that deliveries from captive supplies would increase as cash market
prices increase, thus decreasing  buying pressure on cash market prices.  Higher cash
market prices (TRPRCt) were positively associated with increased percentage deliveries
of captive supply cattle.
Basis (BSSt) was expected to affect deliveries of forward contracted cattle through its
relationship  with current market prices.  When combined with the transaction  price
variable,  basis  represents the movement  of the futures market relative  to the cash
market. One argument is that as the basis strengthens, indicating that cash prices are
increasing relative  to futures  market  prices,  packers  may  deliver cattle  from their
forward contracted inventory to reduce cash market buying pressure, thus allowing cash
market prices to decline temporarily. However, an unexpected inverse relationship was
found between basis and forward contract deliveries.
Lagged futures market prices (LCFMPt1) were included in the equations for percent-
age of packer-fed and marketing agreement cattle. As futures market prices increase for
the nearby contract, packers may increase deliveries from captive supply inventories to
reduce buying pressure in the cash market. Again, an unexpected inverse relationship
was found between the futures market price and deliveries of  both marketing agreement
and packer-fed cattle.
Generally,  results for the three equations  explaining deliveries of cattle from the
three types of captive supply inventories were weak. This was the first attempt to model
captive supply deliveries, and more research is needed.
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Table 5.  Results for Captive Supply Variables: Model  1, Equation (5)
Coefficient  Coefficient
Variable  ($/cwt)  Flexibility a  Variable  ($/cwt)  Flexibility a
PQFCt  -0.05*  -0.0004  PQMAt -0.36*  -0.0030
(7.40)  (13.87)
PQPFt  -0.06  0.0005
(1.74)
Notes:  An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values
of calculated t-statistics.
a  Flexibilities are the regression  coefficient times the inverse of the mean transaction price.
Model 1: Captive Supply Deliveries-Price  Relationships,  Equation (5). Table 5 shows
results  for  captive  supply  variables  in the  transaction  price  equation  of Model  1.
Increasing deliveries of cattle from two of the three types of captive supply inventories
were associated with lower transaction prices  for fed cattle. A 1% increase in captive
supply deliveries, which are measured in percentages, was associated with: a $0.05/cwt 8
decline in fed cattle transaction prices for forward contracted cattle (PQFCt),  a $0.36/cwt
decline for marketing agreement cattle (PQMAs), and no significant impact for packer-
fed  cattle  (PQPFr). For  all three  types  of captive  supplies,  a  one percentage  point
increase in deliveries from each respective inventory of captive supply cattle represents
a significant  increase in use of captive  supplies based on mean values for each type
(table 2). Flexibilities also are  resented in table 5. Percentage changes in transaction
prices from a 1% increase in each captive supply procurement method are small-less
than 1% in all cases.
A modified-Hausman  test (Godfrey)  was used to test for simultaneity between the
percentage  delivery of cattle from captive  supply inventory and transaction prices for
fed cattle. Test results indicated there was simultaneity between cash market trans-
action prices and percentage deliveries of forward contracted and marketing agreement
cattle, but not packer-fed cattle. Thus, decisions by packers to deliver forward contracted
and marketing agreement cattle are made simultaneously with decisions to purchase
cash market cattle. However, the decision to deliver packer-fed cattle (PQPF,)  is made
independently of the decision to purchase cash market cattle. Results suggest price is
not a decision variable for packers when timing packer-fed cattle deliveries.
No previous  research has  considered  the  simultaneity  question,  and  no previous
studies have specifically examined impacts from packer-fed and marketing agreement
deliveries, so no direct comparison can be made between our model results and previous
work.  However,  previous studies which examined impacts from deliveries of forward
contracted cattle (Elam; Hayenga and O'Brien; Schroeder et al. 1993) found negative or
mixed impacts on fed cattle prices from increased deliveries. A negative relationship was
found here.
Model 2: Captive Supply Inventory-Price  Relationships, Equation  (6). Coefficients on
individual captive supply inventory variables had mixed signs, while the coefficient on
8 All prices are stated in dollars per hundredweight ($/cwt) of dressed weight.
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Table 6.  Results for Captive Supply Variables: Model 2, Equation (6)
Coefficient a  Coefficienta
Variable  ($/cwt)  Flexibility b  Variable  ($/cwt)  Flexibility b
QFCt  0.013*  0.000773  QMAt  -0.017*  -0.001675
(7.25)  (7.63)
QPFt -0.179*  -0.000945  QTOTt  -0.002  -0.000326
(11.60)  (1.06)
Notes:  An asterisk (*)  denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values
of calculated t-statistics.
aCoefficients  were  converted to represent  price  ($/cwt) changes for a  1,000-head  change  in the captive
supply vehicle.
bFlexibilities are the regression coefficient times the mean of the captive supply inventory variable divided
by the mean transaction price.
Table 7.  Results for Procurement Method Variables: Model 3, Equation (7)
Coefficient  Coefficient
Variable  ($/cwt)  Variable  ($/cwt)
DCASHt  Base  DPKRFED t 0.01
(0.16)
DFWDCON  -3.16*  DMKTAGREEt  0.10*
(67.99)  (3.82)
Notes:  An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values
of calculated t-statistics.
the total captive supplies variable was not significant (table 6). A 1,000-head increase
in the size  of captive  supply inventory  was  associated with: a  $0.01/cwt increase  in
transaction prices for the forward contract inventory (FC),  a $018/cwt  iy  decline for the
packer-fed inventory (QPFt),  and a $0.02/cwt decline for the marketing agreement inven-
tory (QMAt).  In each case, a 1,000-head increase  in the inventory of captive supplies
represents a substantial increase based on mean values in table 2 for the study period.
Results suggest different types of captive supplies have differential impacts on fed cattle
prices. Thus, a total captive supply inventory variable (QTOTb) was substituted for the
individual captive supply inventory variables to assess the overall impact from the three
types of captive supplies. Its coefficient was not statistically  significant.
Flexibilities  also are presented  in table  6,  and are  small. A  1%  increase  in cattle
purchases by any captive supply method or all three methods combined had less than
a 1% impact on fed cattle transaction prices.
Model 3: Captive Supply-Cash Price  Differences, Equation  (7). Average price differ-
ences between cash market transaction prices and prices for captive  supply variables
also were mixed (table 7). A large average price difference was found between forward
contract  prices  and  cash  market  prices  (DFWDCONt) over  the  study  period.  For-
ward contract prices averaged $3.16/cwt below cash market transaction prices, which
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translates to $1.99/cwt  on a live weight basis using a 63% dressing percentage.  Large
initial price  differences between  forward contract  prices and  cash market  problems
raised questions  about correct model  specification.  It was argued  that the time  lag
between  purchase  date  and  slaughter  date  for  forward  contracts  in  a downward-
trending market contributed to the large negative differential.  As a result, cubic time-
trend  variables  were  included  in  Model  3  to  remove  the  within-year  price  trend.
However, results for average price differences were robust. Results here paralleled but
were somewhat higher than findings by Eilrich  et al., where net basis  contracts  and
simulated hedged prices were $1.77/cwt less than cash market prices on a live weight
basis, assuming an average transportation cost of $0.40/cwt for cattle feeders. Results
support the theoretical conclusion by Carlton that forward contract prices are expected
to be  lower than the  expected  value  of cash  market  prices.  These  findings suggest
packers have a significant economic incentive to use forward contracts in purchasing fed
cattle.
Cattle feeders also have an incentive to use basis contracts. Koontz and Trapp studied
cattle feeding profits for 33,250 pens of cattle fed in 64 southern plains feedlots from
May  1986 through March 1993.  They found that the contribution of basis risk to pen
profit variability  was four times  greater than the contribution from price-level  risk.
Reducing  basis risk,  such as by basis  contracts,  could reduce  pen profit variability
by  40%.  Their  results,  combined  with results  here,  suggest that  basis  contracting
may reduce profit variability for cattle feeders, but only at some lower price and profit
level.
Average price  differences between packer-fed cattle (DPKRFED,)  and cash market
cattle (DCASH,) were not significant.  The  price recorded  for packer-fed  cattle  is in
essence a transfer price between the cattle feeding and cattle slaughtering divisions of
the company, not a market-discovered  transactions price. This price might be expected
to track cattle  feeding  costs  or track the cash market  price,  so that transfer  prices
represent current market conditions.
Average prices for marketing agreement cattle (DMKTAGREE,) were significantly
higher ($0.10/cwt) than for cash market cattle. Assuming marketing agreements result
in increased exchange  of information  between feeders  and packer regarding  carcass
performance,  then  one  could  expect  a  positive  price  difference  between  fed  cattle
purchased by marketing agreement compared with those purchased in the cash market.
Over time, cattle feeders should use the additional information and improved communi-
cations to better feed and market fed cattle, which should be reflected in higher prices.
Additionally, the incremental information may allow feeders to alter the type of feeder
cattle purchased  so  as to better match  packers' demands  when cattle reach market
weight.  The higher price may also represent lower transactions costs associated with
procuring cattle via marketing agreement.
Summary and Conclusions
The overall objective of this study was to measure the impacts of captive supplies  on
cash  market  transaction  prices  for  fed  cattle,  and  three  alternative  models  were
estimated. Simultaneity was found between the decisions to deliver forward contracted
and  marketing  agreement  cattle  and the  decision  to purchase  cash market  cattle.
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Negative  relationships  were  found between  transaction  prices  and  the  percentage
deliveries from the inventory of forward contracted and marketing agreement cattle.
Results measuring transaction price impacts from the absolute size of the captive
supply  inventory  were  mixed.  The total  inventory  of captive  supply  cattle  had no
significant  effect  on cash  market transaction  prices.  The  price impact was negative
for packer-fed  and  marketing agreement  cattle,  but positive  for forward  contracted
cattle.
Significant average price differences were found to depend on procurement methods
during  the  study  period.  Forward  contract  prices  averaged  much  lower than cash
market transaction prices. Prices for packer-fed cattle were not significantly different
than  those  for  cattle  purchased  in the  cash  market,  while  prices  paid  for  cattle
purchased via marketing agreement were higher.
On balance,  captive  supplies  during the  study period  did not have large  adverse
effects on fed cattle transaction prices. Impacts were somewhat mixed, but results, when
negative,  generally were small. The expected large negative impacts that contributed
to Congress mandating the study (Packers and Stockyards Program) and large negative
impacts  subsequently  claimed  by cattle  producers  (USDA, Advisory  Committee  on
Agricultural Concentration) were not found. Cattle feedlot and packing plant locations
had a greater impact on transaction prices than did captive supplies.
While  this  study  was the  first in several  respects  to  estimate  transaction  price
impacts and had access to the most comprehensive data available for any captive supply
study, results raise several  unanswered questions,  pointing  to the need for further
research.  Model results for the percentage deliveries from each type of captive supply
inventory were informative but weak in terms of explanatory power, and produced some
conceptually  unexpected  results.  A  complete  theory  of use  and impacts  of captive
supplies is needed. The complete theory needs to account for incentives to use captive
supply marketing/procurement methods, both for cattle feeders and packers, as well as
timing of expected  market  impacts.  The attempt  to  account  for time lags between
purchase and slaughter dates was limited, and may have contributed  to the finding of
the large  average price difference  between forward contract  prices and cash market
prices. However,  these results did not differ greatly from previous research. All results
may be sensitive to the study period, geographic coverage of the data, and model speci-
fication. Further research is needed with data for other time periods,  as well as for
smaller  geographic  areas,  since  captive  supply impacts may be  more relevant when
estimated  for localized  market areas.  While this study focused  on transaction  price
impacts,  we  recommend  also estimating  captive  supply impacts  on daily or weekly
average fed cattle prices in future research.
[Received November 1997; final revision received March 1998.]
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